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Abstract Marine biosecurity, the protection of the
marine environment from impacts of non-indigenous
species, has a high profile in New Zealand largely
associated with a dependence on shipping. The Min-
istry of Fisheries is the lead agency for marine
biosecurity and is tasked with managing the risks
posed by pests and non-indigenous marine species.
Much like the terrestrial environment, multiple path-
ways provide ample opportunities for new species
to arrive. The Marine Biosecurity Team was estab-
lished in 1998, and under the Biodiversity package
delivered by government, has undertaken an ambi-
tious programme to deliver biosecurity outcomes by
reducing the knowledge gaps and establishing man-
agement frameworks. A Risk Management Frame-
work aids decision-making and operational planning.
Despite significant progress, a number of gaps have
been identified in our knowledge base, capability,
and capacity that require attention.
Keywords biological introductions; marine
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INTRODUCTION
The introduction of organisms through human-
mediated dispersal into regions where they did not
exist in evolutionary and ecological time has resulted
in significant ecological, economic, and social
consequences (Carlton 1996, 2001; Pimentel et al.
2000; Hewitt 2003a). This issue is now considered
to be one of the top threats to native biological
diversity, equal to the threat posed by human-
mediated global climate change (Lubchenco et al.
1991; Carlton 2001; Hewitt 2003b). Biosecurity
(biological security) is the management of the risks
posed by introduced species to environmental,
economic, social, and cultural (including spiritual)
values. Biosecurity activities generally include
quarantine activities (prevention of the entry and
border surveillance for pests and diseases),
surveillance, short-term response, and long-term
control of established pests (e.g., integrated pest
management) (e.g., Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Environment 2000; Biosecurity Council 2003).
In addition, biosecurity responsibilities include audit
and enforcement of legislation, providing sanitary
and phytosanitary assurances to trading partners and
may include protections against bioterrorism
(Meyerson & Reaser 2002, 2003).
Aotearoa, New Zealand, lies in the southern
Pacific Ocean, 2000 km east of Australia. New
Zealand has the world’s 4th largest Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 2.2 million km2 of
ocean ranging over 30º of latitude—from the
subtropical Kermadec Islands to subantarctic
Auckland and Campbell Islands. The geographic
isolation makes New Zealand reliant on sea-borne
shipping for the majority (over 90% total volume)
of its international commerce. Simultaneously, as an
island nation, New Zealand has certain values
(biodiversity, economic, social, spiritual) that are
particularly at risk to biological invasions both on
land and in the oceans (Ministry for the Environment
1995).
The total value of marine ecosystems (incor-
porating value of indigenous biodiversity and
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ecosysytem function) was calculated in 1994 to be
NZ$184 billion per year (including fisheries)
(Patterson & Cole 1999), more than twice the New
Zealand Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for that year
and more than half of the total biodiversity valuation
(NZ$230 billion). Two-thirds of New Zealand’s total
biodiversity (freshwater, marine, and terrestrial) is
found in the EEZ (Department of Conservation
2001). Many of these species are endemic as a result
of New Zealand’s 120-million-year geographic
isolation from other landmasses. Endemicity ranges
between 30% in the algae to over 95% in the sponges
(Department of Conservation 2000; Francis &
Nelson 2003). Such geographically restricted species
tend to be vulnerable to the direct and indirect
impacts of introduced species (Carlton 2001).
Economically, this zone produces c. 1% of the
world’s total fisheries catch. The New Zealand
commercial catch and aquaculture production is
estimated at c. 650 000 metric tonnes per year with
export revenues totalling NZ$1.49 billion (US$833
million) and domestic revenues c. NZ$130 million
(US$75.8 million) for the year ending December
2000 (Statistics New Zealand <http://
www.stats.govt.nz> accessed 9 September 2003;
SeaFIC unpubl. data).
A strong sense of connection with the marine
environment is imbued in the culture of New
Zealand, particularly in the indigenous Maori
population (Biosecurity Council 2003). The key
values associated with recreational and social use of
the marine environment are difficult to quantify, yet
tourism comprises c. 9% of GDP and is increasing
on an annual basis. The value of the marine
environment to Maori is holistic, based on spiritual
and traditional aspects of Maori culture. It is virtually
impossible to place monetary valuations on this
component. The Treaty of Waitangi secured and
guaranteed Maori rights to fisheries and other
treasures. Unmanaged threats to these resources
could be construed as an erosion of these rights.
Biosecurity in New Zealand is governed under the
Biosecurity Act 1993 (administered by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF)). Biosecurity of
the marine environment is delivered by a variety of
groups in central and local government, however the
Ministry of Fisheries has primary responsibility.
Under the Biosecurity Act 1993, a Chief Technical
Officer (CTO) has been appointed in the Ministry
of Fisheries with responsibilities allocated by the
Director General of MAF. Statutory powers allow
the CTO or their approved persons to declare
unwanted organisms, enter a place and inspect for
unwanted organisms or risk goods, give directions
to treat risk goods for unwanted organisms, and put
in place area controls.
In this paper we discuss the biosecurity risks to
the New Zealand marine environment and provide
an outline of the current state of central government
delivery with a discussion of the challenges to our
meeting the expected outcomes.
CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
Non-indigenous marine species (NIMS)
The combination of an active awareness campaign
by central government and the significant value New
Zealanders place on the ocean environment has led
to a greater awareness of NIMS in the general
population relative to other regions of the world.
Over 150 NIMS have been identified in New
Zealand’s marine ecosystems (Gordon & Mawatari
1992; Cranfield et al. 1998; Nelson 1999). These
NIMS have been detected in virtually all coastal
habitat types in New Zealand, with representatives
of three divisions of plants and eight phyla of animals
(Cranfield et al. 1998; Nelson 1999). Many of these
species present unknown risks with likely impacts
difficult to identify (but see Forrest & Taylor 2003;
Hewitt 2003a; Ross et al. 2003a,b).
Pathways
It is believed that Maori settled New Zealand over
1000 years ago. In all likelihood, NIMS were
transported to New Zealand on the hulls of their
waka (canoes). In contrast, European “discovery”
and eventual settlement of New Zealand signifi-
cantly expanded the opportunities for NIMS
transport resulting in larger numbers of species from
a wider array of ecoregions establishing successfully
(Crosby 1986).
A number of pathways continue to operate in New
Zealand including ballast water, hull fouling, sea-
chests, and the aquarium trade (aquaculture transfers
of stock and gear are considered a low international
risk because of current safeguards but remain a
domestic risk). Ballast water has received the most
attention internationally because of links with several
high profile invaders. New Zealand receives a
substantial volume of ballast water relative to the size
of the country from a large number of source regions
(Fig. 1; see also Wotton & Hewitt 2004). The total
volume for 2002 was 4.4 million mt (an increase of
11% from 2001) with all international ports of first
entry receiving ballast water discharge (Wotton &
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Hewitt 2004). Overall, the greatest volume of ballast
is discharged by bulkers (2.5 million metric tonnes
in 2002) and tankers (1.5 million metric tonnes in
2002).
Hull fouling has been assumed to represent an
historic pathway associated with wooden vessels of
the last 500 years. However, recent evidence
suggests that both hull fouling and sea-chests (intake
chambers in the hulls of vessels) of modern vessels
present significant risks (e.g., Coutts et al. 2003;
Lewis et al. 2003; Minchin & Gollasch 2003). Over
3300 international vessels arrived in New Zealand
in 2002, representing a variety of hull fouling risks.
The majority were commercial merchant vessels
(2581) operating at high speeds with good
maintenance schedules minimising external hull
fouling risks, however sea-chests and internal piping
may harbour communities (Coutts et al. 2003). An
additional 794 vessels were categorised as
recreational yachts whose maintenance schedules
vary significantly (Floerl & Inglis unpubl. data). As
has been demonstrated in New Zealand (Hay &
Dodgshun 1997; James & Hayden 2000; Floerl &
Inglis unpubl. data) and elsewhere (Darwin,
Australia—Bax 1999; Willan et al. 2000; Cairns,
Australia—K. Niel pers. comm.), the hull fouling on
these vessels poses a current risk to the integrity of
marine communities. Hull fouling inspection regimes
do not exist in any nation; this gap has been identified
as a significant unmanaged risk internationally
(Minchin & Gollasch 2003) and in New Zealand.
CURRENT STATE OF
MARINE BIOSECURITY DELIVERY
The Ministry of Fisheries has had a Marine
Biosecurity Team since 1998. In this short time,
significant progress has been made in identifying the
delivery requirements, developing prioritisation
Fig. 1 Origins of ballast water
discharged in New Zealand during
2002–03. Source regions are cat-
egorised according to the IUCN
bioregionalisation of Kelleher et al.
(1995). Volumes of less than 0.01
million mt are identified by arrows.
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frameworks, and establishing research projects to
underpin the development of policy and response
capability.
Risk management framework
The lack of knowledge, limited capacity, and low
funding has required a pragmatic approach to
developing policy and management options. The
Ministry undertook the development of a Risk
Management Framework (RMF) to evaluate the
critical system risks to biosecurity delivery as a
mechanism for prioritisation (Cox unpubl. data).
This RMF focuses on managing biosecurity risks to
four core values: Healthy Environment, Strong
Communities, Vibrant Commerce, and High Quality
Recreation.
Pre-border management
Current activities in pre-border management include
a ballast water Import Health Standard, which
requires mid-ocean ballast water exchange and no
discharge of un-exchanged waters from any country
unless exempted on the grounds of safety. No
discharges of un-exchanged water sourced from
Tasmania and Port Phillip Bay, Victoria, Australia
are permitted (i.e., no exemptions). This unilateral
action was one of the first globally (Hewitt 2003b).
New Zealand also actively participates in the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Marine
Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) in the
development of International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ship’s  Ballast Water
and Sediments (adopted 13 February 2004; see:
http://www.imo.org>, accessed 8 March 2004).
The Ministry has contracted research to determine
the risk profile of species likely to be transferred to
New Zealand (associated with shipping) based on
current trading activities. This project (conducted by
Sinclair Knight Merz) has provided a first move
towards risk profiling in the New Zealand context
using similar methodologies as Ricciardi &
Rasmussen (1998) and Hayes & Sliwa (2003). Next
steps include determining likely impacts on the core
values in the RMF for each potential invader.
Our ability to discern and prioritise management
based on relative risks of the primary pathways
(ballast water, hull fouling, aquaculture) for domestic
and international transfers has been recognised as a
significant gap in our understanding. The need to
undertake preliminary evaluations in a consistent
fashion (e.g., Jones & Hayden 2000) must be
coupled with management outcomes to provide
biosecurity delivery. In the meantime, mechanisms
and tools (including risk assessment) for pre-border
management of hull fouling are progressing in
international fora (e.g., IMO GloBallast Risk
Assessment Workshop 2003).
Border management
Marine borders are difficult to manage; no clear
boundary exists before physical arrival in port.
Organisms living on a vessel’s hull can potentially
spawn while transiting coastal waters up to the point
of berthing in port (before inspection). Over 20
active marine pathways have been identified in New
Zealand (Table 1). However, two are considered to
pose the most serious threat: ballast water and hull
fouling of merchant and recreational vessels.
As discussed above, merchant vessels are required
to exchange ballast at sea (outside the NZ EEZ) and
provide details to MAF Quarantine Service inspectors
for evaluation of ballast water management for each
ship visit to New Zealand. MAF Quarantine Service
inspectors give permission for ballast water discharge
on the basis of this information.
As elsewhere in the world, our ability to manage
hull fouling at the border is limited to the tools at
hand. Pre-border management and education to
maintain clean hulls will always be the best option.
Hull fouling is not currently inspected at the border.
However, border officers collect information that is
being used to determine risk. The Ministry is
developing standards for facilities to treat fouled
vessels and a suite of guidelines and tools to increase
awareness of the need to remove hull fouling before
travelling to another region. Simultaneously, border
and valued area management options are being
developed. Additional work is being undertaken by
various research providers to determine the relative
risks between categories of vessels.
These border risks are increasing quickly; over the
past 4 years merchant vessel visits have increased
by 10% per annum with an associated increase in
ballast water discharge. Simultaneously, changing
patterns of trade are exposing New Zealand to
additional species not previously capable of reaching
New Zealand (Taylor et al. 2000). Similarly, the
growth of internet based mail-order for the aquarium
trade has resulted in a proliferation of available
species, some of which pose significant threats to our
marine environment (e.g., Caulerpa taxifolia).
Post-border management
Our current state of knowledge of NIMS in New
Zealand has been derived in an ad hoc fashion,
harvesting information from museums, published
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literature, and anecdotal collection. New Zealand has
embarked on a series of central government funded
baseline evaluations of high risk entry points to
determine the current scale of introductions (Wotton
& Hewitt 2004) using internationally accepted
protocols (Hewitt & Martin 2001). The baseline
surveys are being completed by NIWA under
contract to the Ministry in 13 ports and three marinas
with re-surveys scheduled after 3 years. These re-
surveys will allow an evaluation of the current rate
Table 1 List of international and domestic pathways of relevance to New Zealand (based on Carlton 2001; ICES
Code of Practice).
Category Pathway
Ships Ballast water and sediments
Hull fouling
Moveable structures Solid ballast
(Oil platforms, barges, dredgers, floating docks)
Hull fouling
Ballast water and sediments
Other craft Hull projections and cavities
(Merchant, fishing, and recreational/leisure) (sea-chests, thrusters, and internal piping)
Hull boring
Aquatic cargo (wells and tanks)
Anchor/anchor chains/lockers/moorings
Scuppers and bulwarks
Small craft trailers
Dredging spoil
Aquaculture fisheries Intentional release and stock movements
Accidental release
Gear movement
Discarded nets, floats, traps
Discarded packaging materials
Discharge of feeds (live, fresh, and frozen)
Release of transgenic and GMO species
Wild fisheries Stock movement
Population re-establishment
Processing of live, fresh, and frozen products
Live bait movement
Gear and transport media (water) movement
Discarded/lost fishing gear
Discard of target and non-target species (bycatch)
Live trade for consumption: accidental/intentional release
Aquarium industry and public aquaria Intentional release
Accidental release
Untreated aquarium and waste discharge
Living food movement
Marine leisure tourism Live bait movement
Accidental/intentional transport and release of fishing catch
Diving gear movement
Fishing gear (including boots) movement
Research and education Intentional release
Accidental release
Water and waste discharges
Living food movement
Diving gear movement
Field and experimental gear movement
Restoration, mitigation and rehabilitation
Other Alteration of water courses and flow regimes
Irrigation canals (including saline ponds)
Municipal and other waste/water treatment discharges
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of invasions and help identify further surveillance
needs (see Hewitt & Martin 2001).
Additionally, a surveillance regime in high-risk
entry points has been established for early detection
of incursions of a suite of six notifiable organisms
(Wotton & Hewitt 2004). Detection capabilities are
being evaluated, specifically for the listed notifiable
organisms. As a result of increased awareness and
observation, the rate of detections and reporting
activities has significantly increased since 2000
(Fig. 2).
Incursion response activities are guided by a
standard protocol, which has been developed to
provide a clear and transparent decision-making
process. The core values of the RMF establish the
context for incursion response risk assessment
guidelines, based on New Zealand risk management
standards (Standards New Zealand 1999, 2000).
Incursion response is closely linked to surveillance
activity, with response plans being prepared for the
six notifiable organisms (Wotton & Hewitt 2004).
The management of domestic translocation path-
ways has been identified as a high priority to pre-
vent the movements of NIMS already in New
Zealand. High-risk movements of vessels and
aquaculture gear pose a significant threat to several
“high-value” areas. A voluntary Code of Practice for
hull cleaning has been developed and implemented
for vessels trading with the subantarctic and
Chatham Islands.
A focal challenge to the development of a marine
biosecurity capability has been the post-border
management of the Japanese kelp, Undaria
pinnatifida. Several lessons have been learned through
the management of this species. Tools for response,
domestic pathway management, and control measures
have been developed. These have helped to identify
gaps, as discussed below.
CHALLENGES
The marine environment is a new focus for
biosecurity in New Zealand. As illustrated above,
significant measures are in place and solid progress
has been made to date to manage risks posed to the
marine environment. However, in pursuing our goal
of a comprehensive, end-to-end regime for marine
biosecurity, further steps are needed. The challenges
identified in the Biosecurity Strategy (Biosecurity
Council 2003) relate to knowledge, capability, and
capacity. Here, we discuss some critical gaps, though
many others exist.
Knowledge
Our knowledge base for marine invasions is poor
(Carlton 1996; Ruiz & Hewitt 2002; Hewitt 2003b)
and we currently do not have a clear understanding of
the number (and identity) of marine invasions in New
Zealand coastal waters outside of specific high-risk
entry points. This is being rectified with current
research projects. However, the baseline evaluations
should be extended to those areas subject to high
impact risks (rather than solely high incursion threats).
Similarly, we have only a rudimentary ability to predict
which species are likely to be transported to New
Zealand, and determine whether they pose a significant
threat to the core values identified in the RMF. Our
knowledge of existing pathways for marine species to
enter, or be moved around within, New Zealand, and
the relative risks posed by these pathways, requires
additional research and evaluation.
One challenge to central government is to identify
such research needs, both for pathways into and
within New Zealand. Increasing our knowledge base
will not solely service biosecurity, but will also aid
our understanding of and obligations to biodiversity,
fisheries management, and other outcomes.
Capability
Our capability to manage pre-border risks (e.g., ballast
water and hull fouling associated with international
shipping, fishing vessels, and hull fouling of
Fig. 2 Detected incursions of New Zealand’s marine en-
vironment, based on dates of first record (or dates of col-
lection from an isolated and previously believed uninfected
locality) and period of active surveys and surveillance
activities.
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recreational yachts) is restricted to available
technologies and regulatory arrangements. The
development of an international instrument to manage
the risks of ballast water (International Convention for
the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water
and Sediments; see also Hewitt 2003b; McConnell
2003) will greatly increase our responsibility, yet the
capability to monitor and regulate this instrument once
adopted by New Zealand will need to be established.
The issues associated with hull fouling are more
problematic and will require tremendous effort to
identify the most appropriate mechanisms to achieve
management outcomes. As discussed previously,
numerous voluntary regimes have been explored as
short-term solutions, yet the growing realisation that
the ban on tri-butyltin (TBT) antifouling paints
(International Convention on the Control of Harmful
Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, adopted 5 October
2001; <http://www.imo.org> accessed 9 September
2003) will have downstream impacts on hull fouling
associated invasions indicates that new solutions to old
problems need to be developed.
Our capability to detect species both at the border
(interception) and post-border (surveillance) is
significantly restricted. Few tools for rapid detection
and unequivocal identification are available. Those that
do exist rely heavily on taxonomic expertise. This
taxonomic capability is limited in many marine groups.
Tools are being developed to increase our ability to
evaluate management activity (e.g., ballast exchange)
or to detect individual species using molecular (Deagle
et al. 2003) or biochemical techniques. However, these
require significant research and development funding.
There is no Crown funded National Centre explicitly
for the rapid diagnosis of marine organisms, unlike the
terrestrial biosecurity National Centre for Disease
Investigation. As such, we rely on capacity to be
maintained in museums, universities, and research
institutions without explicit funding arrangements to
meet this critical role. Without explicit support for this
capability, New Zealand will continue to be at risk of
the continued loss of taxonomic skills because of an
aging population with little replenishment (Dayton
2003).
Lastly, the tools are limited for treating pathways
and undertaking eradication or control campaigns in
the marine environment. For example, ballast water
treatment systems and methods are being developed
and tested in New Zealand and abroad; non-TBT hull
fouling treatment systems are being tested; and
verification tools for ballast water exchange are being
evaluated for practical implementation under bilateral
agreements with various nations.
Globally, very few detected marine incursions have
resulted in response actions and, of those, a limited
number have succeeded in eliminating the introduced
population. In all instances, these eradication and
control attempts have been undertaken using either
physical (e.g., diver removal, heat treatment, burial)
or chemical (e.g., chlorine, rotenone) techniques in
restricted areas (e.g., Culver & Kuris 2000; Secord
2003; Hewitt et al. in press). Recent reviews of
available techniques have been undertaken (e.g.,
McEnnulty et al. 2002), yet these techniques require
development and field-testing to determine efficacy
and collateral impact. Bax et al. (2003) discuss the
procedures that should be considered to undertake a
response action. This framework is loosely correlated
with the approach adopted in the Ministry of Fisheries
(see Wotton & Hewitt 2004).
Capacity
New Zealand’s marine environment is highly valued
in environmental, economic, spiritual, and social
contexts. The NZ EEZ represents 22 times the
landmass, and c. 5% of primary productivity GDP, yet
current biosecurity investment in the marine sector is
less than 1.5% of central government’s total
biosecurity expenditure. As a consequence, the
capacity to deliver biosecurity outcomes is severely
hampered. Increasing marine biosecurity capacity is
recognised as a priority in the Biosecurity Strategy
(Biosecurity Council 2003) with core capacity building
required to develop policy, regulate and manage pre-
border, border, and post-border activities.
Multiple research providers undertake marine
biosecurity research activities (e.g., Forrest et al.
2000; Hayden & Whyte 2003). These activities,
however, are currently uncoordinated (Hayden
2000), with funding provided by multiple central
government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Fisheries,
Department of Conservation, Foundation for
Research, Science and Technology, Ministry for the
Environment). The need for a coordinated funding
strategy, with clear leadership roles, is crucial to
guaranteeing scientifically sound biosecurity out-
comes in the marine environment (Biosecurity
Council 2003).
CONCLUSIONS
The Ministry of Fisheries leads the delivery of
marine biosecurity in New Zealand with significant
effort from other local, regional and central
government bodies. The Ministry has taken a
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pragmatic approach to prioritising activity, relying
on a Risk Management Framework to highlight the
most pressing issues. In the short time the Marine
Biosecurity Team has been established, great gains
have been made in developing frameworks and
policies to deliver biosecurity outcomes. Research
has been prioritised to provide input into policy and
management, and specific gaps have been identified
that require additional action. Despite the relative
immaturity of marine biosecurity efforts in New
Zealand, our system is identified globally as one of
the most innovative, comprehensive, and advanced.
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ADDENDUM
As part of the Biosecurity Strategy Implementation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has been
identified as the lead agency for biosecurity delivery in central government, and marine biosecurity func-
tions have been transferred from the Ministry of Fisheries.
